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The Legal Significance of Adolescent
Development on the Right to Counsel:
Establishing the Constitutional Right to
Counsel for Teens in Child Welfare
Matters and Assuring a Meaningful Right to
Counsel in Delinquency Matters
By Jennifer K. Pokempner, Riya Saha Shah, Mark F. Houldin,
Michael J. Dale, and Robert G. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION

Youth involved in the child welfare and juvenile justice systems are
among the most vulnerable children in society. Youth who have contact
with these systems are overwhelmingly poor, from minority populations,'
and tend to have limited access to social supports and resources that might
allow them to avert system involvement. In large part, youth come into
contact with these systems when things are not going well. Involvement in
the child welfare system can occur for multiple reasons, including abuse,
neglect, family breakdown, or crisis. Contact with the juvenile justice system can be for similar reasons, but is triggered by allegations of conduct that
would be criminal if committed by an adult.
A youth's involvement in these systems can be positive and even lifesaving. Success usually depends upon the nature, intensity, and duration of
services that these systems provide. In general, however, keeping youth in
their own homes and providing their families with the tools and resources to
address problems produces better outcomes. In both systems, separation
from family and community and removal from home are among the harshest
and most traumatic actions that the state can take.
* Jennifer Pokempner is a Supervising Attorney at Juvenile Law Center. Riya Saha Shah is
a Staff Attorney at Juvenile Law Center. Mark Houldin is an Assistant Defender at the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Juvenile Unit. Michael Dale is a Professor of Law at Nova
Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. Robert Schwartz is the Executive Director of Juvenile Law Center.
' See Richard P. Barth et al., Placement into Foster Care and the Interplay of Urbanicity,
Child Behavior Problems, and Poverty, 76 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 358, 364 (2006) (dis-

cussing the impact of poverty and other factors on child welfare system involvement); U.S.
Gov'r AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-816, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED To HELP STATEs REDUCE THE PROPORTION IN
CARE 1 (2007), availableat http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-816 (discussing racial
disproportionality).
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In dependency2 and delinquency proceedings, youth have basic liberty
interests in whether or not they are adjudicated dependent or delinquent, in
whether they are removed from their homes, and in the nature, intensity, and
duration of the services that courts order for them. Given the liberty interests at stake in these proceedings, youth must have meaningful access to
counsel to provide a safeguard from the worst consequences of these systems. Despite the importance of counsel, delinquent youth are unrepresented every day across the country.3 This may occur because a youth
waives her constitutional right to counsel. Few states prohibit waiver of
counsel, and numerous factors-from state funding schemes to parental
pressure-lead many youth to appear unrepresented in juvenile court.4 Dependent youth are also often unrepresented. This may occur for several
reasons: First, the Supreme Court has not established a constitutional right to
counsel in dependency matters; second, many states do not provide a statutory right to representation; and finally, states that provide representation
may not require that it be by a lawyer.'
A meaningful constitutional right to counsel in juvenile justice and
child welfare matters is a civil rights issue as well as a child and family wellbeing issue. Proceeding without representation puts youth at risk for poor
outcomes in the justice and child welfare systems. It increases the chance
that the state will be intervening with the wrong child for the wrong reasons.
It increases the chances that the state will coercively intervene beyond what
is necessary to address the problem that brought youth to the system's attention. It fails to give them a voice in matters affecting their lives.
2 In this Article, the term dependency refers to child welfare proceedings in which it is
alleged that a child has been abused, neglected, or not provided proper parental care. We will
use the terms dependency and child welfare matters interchangeably.
See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., YOUTH LAW CTR. & JUVENILE LAW CTR., A CALL FOR
JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DE-

LINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 21 (1995), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf. Since
1995, the National Juvenile Defender Center has done numerous state assessments. These
assessments show that many delinquent youth lack counsel.
4 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also JUVENILE LAW CTR., LESSONS FROM
LUZERNE COUNTY: PROMOTING FAIRNESS, ThANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4-15 (2010),

available at http://www.jlc.org/system/files/topic-related docs/JuvenileLawCenterReport.
pdf?download= 1.

'Michael 1. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35
NOVA L. REv. 305, 338 (2010); Lucy JOHNSTON-WALSH, SUSAN KINNEVY, ALAN M. LERNER
& JENNIFER POKEMPNER, ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA 30-44 (2010), available at http://www.jlc.org/sites/default/files/

publication-pdfs/AssessingQualityofChild Advocacy.pdf.
6 Even states that provide a lawyer may allow counsel to substitute judgment for that of
the client, rather than take direction from the client. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6311 (West 2011) (appointing a guardian ad litem for child in court proceedings); see also
CHILDREN's ADVOCACY INST. OF THE UNIV. OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW, A CHILDS RIGHT
TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 18, 20-23 (2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/misc/

finalrtc_2nd editionIr.pdf (summarizing role of counsel for dependent children for all
states).
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In re Gault established a constitutional right to counsel in the juvenile
justice system.7 But, for years, legal scholars have debated how youth can
meaningfully exercise that right in juvenile justice matters.' Comparatively,
in child welfare matters, the Supreme Court has not reached the question of
whether youth have the constitutional right to counsel. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has recognized the significance of adolescent development to
legal analysis, in general, and to the due process analysis, specifically. 9
In this Article, we address how that developmental analysis should affect youths' rights to counsel. We argue that the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence supports finding a constitutional right to counsel for teens in
child welfare matters. We also argue that the same jurisprudence requires
that the constitutional right to counsel already provided in juvenile delinquency matters under Gault include a prohibition of waiver of counsel by
youth.10

Part I will describe the essential characteristics of adolescents as explained by developmental research and how science should inform the right
to counsel in the child welfare and juvenile justice contexts. Furthermore,
we address how this science has already influenced jurisprudence on youth
issues.
Part II argues for an adolescent's constitutional right to counsel in child
welfare proceedings using jurisprudential and social science developments
to revisit the traditional Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process analysis." This constitutional right rests on theories of attachment and bonding,
the unique aspects of youth, as well as the distinct characteristics of state
action that removes youth from their homes and separates them from their
parents to place them in substitute care. A youth's physical liberty interest,
as well as her interest in family integrity and privacy, are at stake at every
level of these proceedings. This Part argues that given the fundamental interests at stake in these proceedings, increasing the level of due process protections afforded to an adolescent by providing counsel is necessary to
ensure more accurate fact-finding as well as full consideration of the voice
of the youth.
'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
'For discussions of these debates and the recurring issues, see generally Tamar R.
Birkhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justicefor Juveniles, 57 BuFF. L. REv. 1447 (2009);
Ellen Marrus, Gault 40 Years Later: Are We There Yet?, 44 CRiM. L. BULL. 413 (2008); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court-A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 Cium. L. BULL. 371 (2008).

1See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
'0 In this Article, we focus on adolescents because of the significant developments in the
law, social science, and neuroscience related to this age group. While we do not believe this
excludes younger children from our analysis, we do recognize that other developmental issues
do come into play for attorneys representing very young children that we do not address in this
article. When we use the term "youth" in this Article, we are referring to adolescentsminors who are roughly age thirteen and older.
" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

532

[Vol. 47

Part III argues that although In re Gault guarantees the constitutional
right to counsel in delinquency proceedings, this right cannot truly be fulfilled unless it cannot be waived. This Part will explore how the United
States Supreme Court decision in Farettav. California, which holds that a
defendant has the right to represent herself, does not apply in the juvenile
context. This Part will discuss how the vulnerabilities and capacities of
youth relative to adults makes counsel a precursor to the exercise-including waiver-of all other rights guaranteed in juvenile justice proceedings. A
system that allows juvenile waiver of counsel undercuts the right to counsel
itself and thus cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
I.

A.

THE

SUPREME COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE UNIQUE
CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH

Adolescent Development Research and Its Relevance to the
Right to Counsel

While under state care or scrutiny, youth are required to make decisions
that will have great impact on their futures, but they are not generally wellequipped to make such important decisions. Not only do they lack the experiences of adults that help develop decision-making capacities, but their
brains have not yet developed to the degree that allows them to process
information and consider consequences in the same fashion as adults. In
addition, psychosocial factors influence adolescents' perceptions, judgments,
and decision-making abilities, and limit their capacity for autonomous
choice.' 2 As a result, they tend to make more impulsive decisions, engage in
behavior that an adult would avoid, and be more affected by peer pressure
than adults." Youth may be less likely to perceive the long-term consequences of their decisions without guidance and feedback.14 These findings
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents' Judgment and
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 325,
341-42 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence
2

Culpability, in

Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 69 TEMP. L.

REv. 1763, 1774-80 (1995) (describing the impact of psychosocial factors and social context
on adolescent decision making); Kathryn Lynn Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of
Judgment Literature: Age Differences in Delinquency, 32 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 78, 79-80

(2008). Importantly, one of the factors that assists youth to develop good decision-making
skills is the presence of a caring, supportive, and consistent adult. See Cauffman & Steinberg,
supra, at 1774-75 (noting adolescents continue to be influenced by parents on a variety of
issues).
B Rates of impulsivity are high during adolescence and early adulthood and decline thereafter. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as
Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1774-76 (2008).
14 As youth mature, so do their self-management skills, long-term planning, judgment, and
decision-making skills, regulation of emotion, and evaluation of risk and reward. See Lau-

rence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, DiminishedResponsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
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are consistent with neuroscientific research, showing that areas of the brain
associated with impulse control, judgment, and the rational integration of
cognitive, social, and emotional information do not fully mature until early
adulthood."
When children and adolescents are able to grow up in safe settings with
positive family members, mentors, and social supports, they are in the best
position to develop more thoughtful decision-making skills and avoid behavior that may be harmful to them.' 6 Juveniles' responses to stress heighten
their inability to consider a range of options." Because adolescents often
have less experience with stressful situations, they may have a diminished
capacity to respond to such situations." Being involved with the courtwhether as a juvenile defendant or the subject of a child protection proceeding-is undoubtedly a stressful situation," one where many adults may have
difficulty making decisions. Adolescents have a particularly difficult time in
these stressful proceedings because they often believe they only have one
choice: "In situations where adults see several choices, adolescents may believe they have only one option. Sometimes a young person can generate
alternative possibilities and weigh them in a rational decision making process, but typically an inflexible either-or mentality prevails especially under
stress." 20
These age-appropriate limitations in decision-making skills have farreaching impact in judicial proceedings where important rights are at stake.
Having the assistance of counsel to more fully understand the proceedings
and the consequences of decisions may be even more important for adolescents than adults precisely because of these limitations that are characteristic
1009, 1011-12 (2003). Research shows that adolescents are generally less aware of risks
because they have less knowledge and experience than adults, and they typically discount the
long-term consequences of their decisions because of a developmental difference in temporal
perspective. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 221, 222-23 (1995). See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL, supra note 12, at 304.
1" ELIZABETH S. Scorr & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 46-60
(2008).
6 See He Len Chung & Laurence Steinberg, Relations Between Neighborhood Factors,
ParentingBehaviors, Peer Deviance, and Delinquency Among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 42
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 319, 328-29 (2006).
17

Id.

Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 12, at 9, 26.
1

'1 It is also important to note that a youth's involvement with dependency or delinquency
court is generally precipitated by a traumatic event or events and that the very removal from
the home and placement in substitute care is traumatic. Research has also shown that these
youth "often show increased susceptibility to stress, an inability to regulate emotions without
outside support. . . ." JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN:

NEW RESEARCH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TRANSITIONING FROM FOSTER

1, 26 (2011).
Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 Ky. CHILD. RTs. J. 16, 17
(1999) (citation omitted); see also Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in
Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27 (2000).
CARE

20
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of youth. Notably, best practices in the representation of children recommend an active counseling role for the lawyer.2 1 The lawyer must actively
engage with the child so that her wishes can be heard, but also so that the
lawyer can help the client understand the legal standards and issues that may
affect the determinations made by the judge.
B.

The Supreme Court's Application of Principlesof
Adolescent Development

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that constitutional doctrines are informed by juvenile status. The Court has "recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner, and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."22 As discussed below, the Supreme Court has accepted and relied upon the findings
that youth are categorically less mature, more impulsive, and more vulnerable to the influence of authority figures than adults. In light of these findings, the Supreme Court has required that governmental power be calibrated
to the developmental characteristics of youth.23 How the difference between
youths and adults manifests itself in the law is complicated because the
Court must consider the impact of immaturity and vulnerability on the matter at issue, the legal and other importance of the right or interest at stake,
and the competing interests involved. Thus, the Court will pay special attention to whether a fundamental interest is at stake as well as the degree to

ABA standards emphasize the active counseling role of the child's attorney:
The child's lawyer helps to make the child's wishes and voice heard but is not merely
the child's mouth piece. As with any lawyer, a child's lawyer is both an advocate
and a counselor for the client. The lawyer should, without unduly influencing the
child, advise the child by providing options and information to assist the child in
making decisions. The lawyer should explain the practical effects of taking various
positions, the likelihood that a court will accept particular arguments, and the impact
of such decisions on the child, other family members, and future legal proceedings.

21 The

ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPEN§ 7(c)(1) cmt. (2011) [hereinafter ABA MODEL ACT], available at http:/
/apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/docs/abamodel-act_2011 .pdf.
22 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
23 For example, the Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina stated that:
It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no
reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality,
we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.
131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct.
2633, 2641 (2009) ("[T]he reasonableness of [a student's] expectation (required by the Fourth
Amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure." (citation omitted)).
MODEL

DENCY PROCEEDINGS
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which the rights of parents and the state may be implicated or adverse to
those of the youth.
For example, in 1948, in Haley v. Ohio, the Supreme Court articulated a
legal distinction between minors and adults for the purpose of determining
24
the voluntariness of juvenile confessions during custodial interrogation.
This case implicated a youth's constitutional interest, and the interest of the
parents did not figure significantly in the analysis. A youth's vulnerability
and experience were of considerable concern for the Court because these
precise characteristics put the youth at great risk for being subject to pressure in an interrogation. The scientific findings mentioned above explain the
origin of the characteristics of youth that the Court recognized in 1948, bolstering its stance. The Court similarly observed those unique characteristics
almost fifty years ago in Gallegos v. Colorado, a case that concerned custodial interrogations and confessions. The Court found that a juvenile "cannot
be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would
leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his
early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces." 25 The Court further reasoned that an adolescent "cannot
be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.... Without some adult protection against this inequality, a fourteen-year-old boy would not be able to
know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had."26
The critical case articulating children's due process rights in delinquency matters is In re Gault.27 In Gault, the Court held that due process in
delinquency proceedings required at a minimum: written notice of specific
charges before the hearing,28 application of the privilege against self-incrimination,2 9 and the right to counsel." Although the distinction between children and adults justified separate courts, such a separation was constitutional
because the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process applied to
juvenile matters.' The Court "candidly appraised" the nature of juvenile
proceedings and evaluated whether the procedural protections that existed
were adequate to ensure due process for children. 2 After surveying a system that carried with it many of the indicia of the adult system in terms of
penalties and long-term consequences without much of the benevolence initially associated with juvenile court, the Court determined that procedural
protections, similar to those adults receive in criminal court, are necessary to

Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
1 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53 (1962).
26 Id. at 54.
27In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28 Id. at 33-34.
29 Id. at 43-57.
30
Id. at 34-42.
31 Id. at 30.
32
Id. at 21.

24
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ensure fundamental fairness.33 The Court held that the guaranteed protections of notice of charges, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
protection from self-incrimination would enhance the fact finding and accuracy of the proceedings without impairing "the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults
...
4 While enhanced procedural protections may change some aspects of
juvenile court, its core values of rehabilitation and treatment could be sustained." The due process revolution, in short, did not turn juveniles into
adults.
The Court continued this balanced and nuanced approach to examining
the treatment of youth in the justice system in Roper v. Simmons.36 In
Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited capital punishment for minors.37 Then in 2010, in Graham v. Florida,the Court ruled that
the imposition of life sentences without the possibility of parole for youth
convicted of non-homicide offenses was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. 8 The Court recognized unique aspects of youth that are relevant to its analysis. The Court focused on the vulnerability of youth as well
as the impediments they face to thoughtful decision making." In Graham,
the Court further articulated the essential characteristics that distinguish
youth from adults for culpability purposes,40 noting that since Roper v. Simmons, "developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts
of the brain involved in behavioral control continue to mature through late
adolescence." 41 As it would repeat in J.D.B., the Court reasoned that children "are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures" than

adults, and found no reason to "reconsider" these observations about the
"common nature of juveniles." 42
In 2011, the Court applied principles of adolescent development to the
question of whether a juvenile would reasonably believe that she is in custody for purposes of Miranda analysis in J.D.B. v. North Carolina. In this

case, thirteen-year-old J.D.B. was questioned by police at school in a closeddoor conference room without first being given Miranda warnings, having
an opportunity to call his caretaker, or being told he was free to leave. 43 He
3 Id.

34 Id. at 22.

asId. See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 539-40 (1971).
6 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-78 (2005).
31 Id.

at 578-79.

38 Graham v. Florida,
3 Id. at 2026, 2028.

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).

40 Id. at 2026-27; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
4' Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
42

Id. at 2026.

43 J.D.B.

v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011). Note that many studies confirm
that juveniles do not understand the words of the Miranda warnings as well as adults, and do
not appreciate the significance and function of Miranda rights. See generally ALAN GOLDSTEIN & NAOMI GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS (2010);
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eventually confessed his involvement in a series of break-ins." The Court
found that the conclusion that youth react differently than adults to law enforcement and judicial proceedings was both "self-evident to anyone who
was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge" and significant to the legal analysis.45 The "commonsense conclusions" about the way
children think, act, and behave affected the Court's custody analysis 46 : "The
law has historically reflected the same assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them."47
II.

DUE

PROCESS REQUIRES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN

CHILD WELFARE MATTERS
The stakes for children involved in the child welfare system are as high
as in delinquency proceedings. If a child is at serious risk of harm and the
court does not remove her from the home, the child may remain in a dangerous environment without supervision or services. If the court mistakenly
adjudicates a child as dependent, she may be subjected to the trauma of
removal from her home, family, friends, and familiar surroundings. Once
adjudicated as a dependent child, she may languish in foster care for months
or even years, be moved from place to place, and may be permanently separated from her biological family.48
A.

Adolescent Development in the Child Welfare Context and Its Impact
on the Due Process Analysis of the Right to Counsel

The social science and neuroscience findings that bolster the right to
counsel in juvenile justice matters have equal application in the child welfare
context. In addition to the characteristics of adolescents that are applicable
to youth both in child welfare matters and delinquency matters, this Section
will introduce other elements of child and adolescent development that impact the due process analysis.
Removal from an adolescent's family, friends, and community is at
stake in dependency proceedings. Research establishing the importance of
Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 1134, 1134-66 (1980).
44 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400.
45 Id. at 2403.
46 Id. While the Court in J.D.B. focused on the degree to which what makes youth distinct
from adults is commonsense, it also noted that social and cognitive science also supported
these conclusions. Id. at 2403 n.5 (referring to the neuroscience research cited in Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)).
47
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2397.
48
See SUE BADEAU AND SARAH GESIRIECH, A CHILDS JOURNEY THROUGH THE CHILD
WELFARE SYsTEM 6, 8-9 (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our-work-reportdetail.aspx?id= 48990 (detailing a child's journey through the child welfare system and multiple
decision points in the process).
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attachment and supportive relationships is thus particularly relevant in the
child welfare context. Behavioral and neuroscience research establishes that
children's healthy development depends on the development of healthy attachments to consistent and loving caregivers, usually parents. 49 While
much of the attachment literature focuses on the formation of attachments in
early childhood,50 the importance of healthy attachment to adolescents cannot be underestimated. Theorists such as John Bowlby 5' and Mary Ainsworth 52 have established that attachment to a consistent and responsive
caregiver is extremely important to an adolescent developing her identity. 53
When healthy attachments do not form or are disrupted, children do not
experience the security they need to develop in a healthy manner and do not
adopt the protective factors that would help them withstand the adversity of
life.5 4 These healthy attachments help adolescents establish autonomy and
contribute to adolescents' "self-esteem, social competence, emotional adjustment, behavioral self-control, and sense of identity." 5 Child welfare law
and policy take into account these findings by setting appropriately high
standards for removal of a child from the home56 and establishing expedited
timelines for case planning decisions for children in the child welfare sys-

49 See generally Lisa J. Berlin & Jude Cassidy, Relations Among Relationships: Contributions from Attachment Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT 688 (Jude Cassidy & Phillip R. Shavers eds., 1999).
o See, e.g., Stacy S. Drury et al., From Biology to Behavior to the Law: Policy Implications of the Neurobiology of Early Adverse Experiences, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 25, 29 (2010) ("[A]ttachment theory stated that young children not only developed
selective and powerful attachments to their parents or primary caregivers, but when there was
a disruption of this relationship there were lifelong behavioral and psychiatric
consequences.").
"52 See generally JoHN BOWLBY, ArACHMENT AND Loss (2d ed. 1982).
See generally MARY D. SALTER AINSWORTH ET AL., PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE STRANGE SITUATION (1978).
5 See generally Joseph P. Allen & Deborah Land, Attachment in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ArrACHMENT 319 (discussing work by Bowlby and Ainsworth on importance of a

consistent and nurturing caregiver to an adolescent's ability to establish identity and auton-

omy). Given that removal from an adolescent's family, friends, and community is at stake in
dependency proceedings, research establishing the importance of attachment and supportive
relationships is particularly relevant in the child welfare context.
54
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 33, 34 (2d ed.
1979) (describing how removal from the home impacts the development of a child).
" Joseph S. Jackson & Lauren G. Fasig, The Parentless Child's Right to a Permanent
Family, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 26 (2011).
16 In Roe v. Conn, the district court of Alabama considered the testimony of Dr. Albert J.
Solnit on attachment to determine the appropriate standards and due process protections when
a child is removed from the home. The court considered Dr. Solnit's testimony that: (i) "Summary removal of a young child from a parent who has been his major caregiver is a severe
threat to his development. It disrupts and grossly endangers what he most needs, that is, the
continuity of affectionate care from those to whom he is attached through bonds of love"; and
(ii) "Summary removal should be allowed only under conditions in which physical survival is
at stake." 417 F. Supp. 769, 776 (M.D. Ala. 1976). The court referenced the landmark work,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)--co-authored by Dr. Solnit with Dr. Goldstein and Dr. Anna Freud-which discussed this application in great detail. Conn, 417 F.
Supp. at 776 n.6.
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tem." These laws support maintaining stable and healthy attachments when
child safety can be assured and finding such attachments as quickly as possible when they cannot be achieved in the home.
The developmental tasks of adolescence must also be recognized when
considering the contours of due process."8 While a key aspect of due process
is the right to be heard," the Court has explained that the forum in which the
individual is heard must be "meaningful"60 and "appropriate to the nature of
the case."' Courts must consider the nature of the child welfare court proceedings, as well as the fact that the case at issue involves a minor in determining whether the youth is provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Because "most theorists agree that central issues of adolescence in the
United States revolve around identity and independence . . ."62 courts will
have to consider the youth's role in the court process and the procedural
protections they may need to ensure that their rights are protected. Emily
Buss has written:
Decision-making competence and identity formation are distinct
developmental ends, but they are often served by a common set of
experiences and interactions. Contexts in which young people are
given decision-making authority over matters of importance to
them and in which adults engage them in a manner that is supportive and respectful allow young people to develop decision-making
skills, learn from and recover from their mistakes and build on
their successes. 63
For adolescents, this due process right is fully aligned with healthy development and can be significantly facilitated by the involvement of effective
counsel."
s7 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 675(5)(B), (C), (E) (West 2011);

see generally NAT'L RESEARCH COuN-

CIL AND INST. FOR MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS:
HOOD DEVELOPMENT (2000).

THE

SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILD-

" Juvenile court dependency proceedings are similar in structure to delinquency proceedings. The chief difference is that delinquency adjudications require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970). There are also differences in the
consequences of adjudications in each system.
* Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
* Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
61 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
62
WENDY B. SMITH, YOUTH LEAVING FOSTER CARE: A DEVELOPMENTAL, RELATIONSHIPBASED APPROACH TO PRACTICE 70 (2011). See also Emily Buss, FailingJuvenile Courts, and
What Lawyers andJudges CanDo About It, 6 Nw J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 318, 322 (2011) (examining the interaction of juvenile court process and "the tasks of adolescence," and stating that
"the first task is gaining the experience required for competent decision-making and autonomous action, and the second is the development of an understanding of self, as an individual
and a member of various groups and communities that can guide those decisions and
actions.").
63 Id. at 323-24.
' Emily Buss has also noted that the change in federal law that requires that the court
consult with the youth at the court reviews for their dependency case, 42 U.S.C.A. § 675
(5)(C) (West 2011), has not resulted in a widespread change in practice in juvenile court re-
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The Constitutional Bases for a Right to Counsel for Dependent Teens

Taking into account the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the special relationship between the state and a child when placed in
foster care, and the significance of youth in the due process analysis, the
right to counsel for adolescents in child welfare matters should have the
same constitutional basis and rationale as for youth in delinquency court.
While the constitutional right to counsel in juvenile justice matters is
well-established, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether youth
have such a right in child welfare matters.65 To date, only a few jurisdictions
that have addressed this issue have found such a right.66 The Supreme Court
lated to the active participation of youth. Buss, supra note 62, at 330. Buss has stated: "Along
both of these developmental dimensions [decision-making skills and identity formation],
young people's experience in juvenile court runs from empty to negative. Juvenile court proceedings offer young people little to no opportunity to practice making choices and taking
responsibility for those choices, despite the focus at those proceedings on their current and
future plans." Id. at 324.
6 The authors recognize that there continues to be debate in the field regarding whether
the attorney for the child should advocate for the child's best interest or expressed wishes. The
analysis in this Article assumes the traditional attorney-client model of expressed wishes representation that is contained in the ABA Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings. Adopted by the American Bar Association in
August of 2011, the Model Act attempts to be true to the traditional attorney-client model
without ignoring that children are not identical to adults and considerations must be made to
ensure that youth are able to exercise their rights to their capacity. See ABA MODEL ACT,
supra note 21, at § 7(c), (c)(1) ("When the child is capable of directing the representation by
expressing his or her objectives, the lawyer shall maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship
with the child in accordance with the rules of professional conduct."). This includes advising
the child as to options and eliciting the child's wishes in a developmentally appropriate manner. See also id. § 7(c)(2) ("When the child's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.").
' See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976); In re Jamie T.T., 599
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (App. Div. 1993). In Kenny A. v. Perdue,a court provided the most comprehensive constitutional analysis of the right to counsel to date. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353,
1356-64 (N.D. Ga. 2005). While the court referred to the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution to support the right to counsel, it explicitly relied on the due process clause
of the Georgia constitution for its holding. Id. at 1359-60. To arrive at its holding, the court in
Kenny A. first found that:
[C]hildren have fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and TPR proceedings. These include a child's interest in his or her own safety, health, and wellbeing, as well as an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in
having a relationship with his or her biological parents. On the one hand, an erroneous decision that a child is not deprived or that parental rights should not be terminated can have a devastating effect on a child, leading to chronic abuse or even
death. On the other hand, an erroneous decision that a child is deprived or that
parental rights should be terminated can lead to the unnecessary destruction of the
child's most important family relationships.
Id. at 1360. Second, the court found that there was a significant risk of error in the proceedings, in large part due to the subjective standards involved and the discretion of the court that
could not be reduced without improved fact finding, and that other devices, such as review
boards and court appointed special advocates ("CASAs"), were not in as good a position as a
lawyer to eliminate. Id. at 1361. Finally, the court found that the state's interest in child
protection and well-being was served by appointing counsel for the child and that the interest
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has been reluctant to expand the constitutional right to counsel in matters
where physical liberty-in the archetypal form of institutionalization and
imprisonment-are not obviously at stake. For example, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court rejected the claim that parents in child
welfare matters have a constitutional right to counsel when their rights may
be terminated; rather it held that whether representation is constitutionally
necessary to protect the interest at stake will be determined on a case-bycase basis. 67 In Lassiter, which directly addressed the right to counsel, and
Santosky v. Kramer, which raised due process rights of parents in parental
right termination proceedings, the Court indicated that the rights and interests at stake in child welfare proceedings were at least sometimes on par, in
the constitutional sense, with the threat of loss of physical liberty where
parents are concerned. 68
Although the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a categorical constitutional right to counsel in dependency proceedings, the same unique aspects of youth that are outcome-determinative for the due process analysis
distinguish the situation of youth who are removed from their homes, and
placed in state care, from other unsuccessful right-to-counsel cases.69 In
evaluating what procedures are required by due process, courts apply the
three-pronged Mathews v. Eldridgeo balancing test which weighs the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Furthermore, Gault72 and its progeny73 remind that, in the distinct setting of
child welfare proceedings, "the applicable due process standard ... is fundamental fairness," which is applied with an "emphasis on fact-finding
procedures."74
at stake for the child "far outweighs any fiscal or administrative burden that a right to appointed counsel may entail." Id. For an excellent analysis of the decision in Kenny A., see
Erik Pitchal, Children's ConstitutionalRight to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REv. 663 (2006).
67452 U.S. 18, 24-32 (1981).
61 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).
69 See, e.g., Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26 (holding that whether there is a constitutional right to
counsel for parents in termination of parental proceedings must be determined on a case-bycase basis).
70 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
71

Id.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
74 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
72
7
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The Due Process Analysis

1.

Private Interests at Stake for Youth in Child Welfare Matters

a.

The Interest of the Child as Distinguishedfrom That of the
Parent

The Mathews analysis begins with an analysis of the private interest.
While the weight will vary case by case, adolescents in child welfare matters
have a three-part private interest at stake: (i) A right to family integrity; (ii) a
right to not have liberty restricted by state actors (as opposed to parents/
guardians); and (iii) a right, if taken into state care, to a basic level of care
and treatment that is of constitutional magnitude. 5 These interests are significant and distinguish the interests of the youth from the interests of the
parents, which the Court has characterized as "commanding."76
The Supreme Court has made clear that the right to family integrity is
of the highest constitutional weight and is a fundamental right.77 Because
this right is often described as a right to care and control, and discussed in
the context of parents asserting their authority against the state or a decision
the state has mandated, it is generally deemed to belong to the parent. But
arguably this right is a right belonging to the family unit. Although it is
often asserted as a right of control by the parent, it is premised on the parent's duties of care and responsibility to the child." While a child's interest
in family integrity is clearly bound up with that of her parents, it seems clear
that this, too, is an independent interest of the child and has great weight.79
The child's right to family integrity takes on even more weight when one
considers the specific needs and vulnerability of children. Children rely on
their parents for their basic needs and care. They rely on them to meet their
material needs and, to some degree, act for them in the world.
7 We agree with Pitchal that the nature of the interest of the child in family integrity may
differ before and after an adjudication of dependency or finding of parental unfitness. See
Pitchal, supra note 66, at 674. However, due to space limitations we will discuss this interest
generally.
76 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
" See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
" See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
9 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Ilit seems to
me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests
in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too,
must their interests be balanced in the equation."). Another court found that:

This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of
both parent and children. It is the interest of the parent in the 'companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children,' . . . and of the children in not being
dislocated from the 'emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association,' with the parent.
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
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The loss of the parental relationship, even temporarily, has a significant
impact on the child who now must depend on the state to meet her needs. 0
This is distinct from the loss that a parent faces in terms of identity and a
breach in the relationship. Research shows that children removed from their
home and community experience significant trauma, which can have a longlasting impact on their development."' Removal from the home is also traumatic for youth. The trauma of being removed from home and all that is
familiar can disrupt a teen's brain development and the maintenance of
healthy attachments to adults and peers.82 Many of these youth enter the
system already experiencing "failures of nurture from the family system"
and find instability rather than the "reparative relationship[s]" that could
buffer the harm that comes from the trauma of removal.83 These are harms
that the parent does not face. The parent also has more skills, experience,
and supports to deal with and understand the separation.8 4
At the same time, a youth has a heightened interest in an accurate determination regarding whether state intervention is proper when maltreatment
is alleged. The court was acutely aware of the child's interest in In re Jamie
T.T. where the child faced return to the custody of an allegedly abusive parent whom she feared:
The effect of Family Court's exoneration of respondent was to restore to him the primary right to custody of Jamie.

. .

. We would

be callously ignoring the realities of Jamie's plight during the pendency of this abuse proceeding if we failed to accord her a liberty
interest in the outcome of that proceeding, entitling her to the protection of procedural due process.. .. Notably, Jamie had a strong
interest in obtaining State intervention to protect her from further
abuse and to provide social and psychological services for the
eventual rehabilitation of the family unit in an environment safe
for her. Furthermore, Jamie's interest in procedural protection was
80 For a detailed discussion of this impact, see Pitchal, supra note 66, at 676-80. The
Supreme Court has also discussed this impact:

For a child, the consequences of termination of his natural parents' rights may well
be far-reaching. In Colorado, for example, it has been noted: 'The child loses the
right of support and maintenance, for which he may thereafter be dependent upon
society; the right to inherit; and all other rights inherent in the legal parent-child
relationship, not just for [a limited] period . . . , but forever.'
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 n. 11 (1982) (citations omitted).
"' GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 24-26. The trauma resulting from removal is, of
course, combined with the trauma they experience as a result of child abuse and neglect, which
necessitate removal. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, LONG TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2008), available at http://www.childwelfare.
gov/pubs/factsheetslong-term__consequences.pdf.
82
WENDY B. SMITH, YOUTH LEAVING FOSTER CARE: A DEVELOPMENTAL, RELATIONSHIPBASED APPROACH To PRACTICE 69, 79 (2011).
83 Id. at 67.
' Pitchal, supra note 66, at 676-77. See also discussion supra Part II.A for more on the
connection between attachment and development.
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heightened because of the irreconcilably conflicting positions of
her and her parents in this litigation."
b.

Supreme Court Precedent and Federal Court Application of the
Liberty Interest of Youth

Youth also have a liberty interest that is significantly affected once
placed in state care. While youth do not have an identical physical liberty
interest to adults (given that they are, to some degree, always in the custody
of adults), 86 placement in state care cannot be deemed equivalent to being
cared for by parents outside of a state sponsored and regulated system. As
Erik Pitchal has noted, "[a] salient feature of all foster care systems .

.

. is

that decisions about where children will live are made by caseworkers,
agency officials, and judges-as opposed to parents, relatives, or people
who have some lasting connection to them."" For children who are dependent on adults for their care, the dependency on state decision makers must
be acknowledged as different from the restriction on liberty that is experienced as a result of parental decision making that is part of the natural status
of childhood. 8
The Court confronted the liberty interest of youth and the concomitant
due process protections required in Parham v. J.R., a case involving the
commitment of children to mental institutions by their parents or state custodians. 9 The Court acknowledged in Parham the distinction between the
state and parent as caregiver and its impact on the treatment and care that a
child received.90 The Court stated that "[tihe absence of an adult who cares
deeply. for a child" may have an impact on how long a child is hospitalized,
putting the youth at risk of an unnecessarily long period of commitment. 9'
The Court noted how the concerns of family and friends would "provide
continuous opportunities" for an erroneous or bad decision made by the hospital about committing the child to be corrected, indicating that the lack of
such concern and pressure could result in the child lingering in institutional
care without cause. 92 The Court acknowledged that there were due process
implications to this status: "For a child without natural parents, we must
acknowledge the risk of being 'lost in the shuffle.' "' Indeed, several chil8 599 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (App. Div. 1993).
86 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (stating that "juveniles, unlike adults, are
always in some form of custody").
87

Pitchal, supra note 66, at 682.

88 As

the Court in Parham explained, the assumption, which the law supports, that parents
act in the best interest of their child is based on the "natural bonds of affection" between
parent and child. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). The state as parent does not have
those same bonds with the child.
" Parham, 442 U.S. 584.
" Id. at 619.
91 Id.

92 Id.

at 619-20.

9' Id. at 619 (citation omitted).

2012]

The Legal Significance of Adolescent Development

545

dren in Parham who were in state care and had no parental involvement
were lingering in institutional care when it was not needed because no other
placement was available. 4 The Court perceived that a foster child's liberty
interest might be put at risk in such situations where no parental advocate
was present if proper due process protections were not put in place. Moreover, courts have recognized that a child's placement in state care is a significant intrusion on and restriction of the liberty interests of the child by the
state, akin to involuntary commitment or incarceration." This restriction on
liberty is significant in the right-to-counsel analysis because the Court has
recognized this right most clearly where the individual's physical liberty is at
risk.96 The Court's treatment of children and acknowledgement of their special needs and characteristics suggests that care should be taken in examining the degree to which placement in state care restricts children in ways that
are similar to the incarceration of an adult.97
A child's physical liberty interest is also implicated when she is placed
in state care and moved between foster homes. This was made clear in
Smith v. OFFER, where the Court highlighted the high degree of authority of
the child welfare agency to move children.99 The Court recognized that the
system was typically structured by contracts that gave the agency broad plenary authority, including the right to recall the child "upon request."9 Indeed, the data presented in Smith demonstrated that children were frequently
moved between placements while in care.'" Many cases and data following
Smith continue to demonstrate that large numbers of children in foster care
suffer from multiple moves and long stays in care.10' As discussed above,
9 Id. at

619-20.

" See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en

banc) ("The liberty interest in this case is analogous to the liberty interest in Youngberg
[where an individual was involuntarily committed]. In both cases, the state involuntarily
placed the person in a custodial environment, and in both cases, the person is unable to seek
alternative living arrangements."); see also Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Il. 1989)
(same).
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
wIn fact, courts have indicated that "defenseless children" taken into state care because
of abuse and neglect should receive "at least the same protection afforded adults who are
imprisoned as a result of their own misdeeds." Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797.
98431 U.S. 816 (1977).
9 Id. at 860 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1

' Id. at 837.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPr OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. CHILD. BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE
OUTCOMES 2004-2007: REPORT TO CONGRESS 32, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/pro10'

grams/cb/pubs/cwo04-07/cwo04-07.pdf (reporting that states continue to struggle with reduc-

ing the number of placement changes that youth in care experience, especially youth who have
been in care for longer periods of time, with almost 60% of youth who had been in care for at
least two years having more than two placement moves); James G. Barber et al., The
Predictorsof Unsuccessful Transition to Foster Care, 42 J. CmLD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY
785, 785-90 (2001) (describing the link between multiple placements and behavioral, emotional, and educational problems); CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES INCHILD WELFARE, UNIV. OF
MINN. SCH. OF Soc. WORK, PROMOTING PLACEMENT STABILITY (2010), available at http://
www.cehd.umn.edu/ssw/cascw/attributes/PDF/publications/CW360_2010.pdf. This journal is-
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these frequent moves disrupt important developmental processes and have
also been tied to poor outcomes, such as lower rates of placement in a family
setting and poor educational achievement.102 Cases from Smith to Braam
continue to show that once in the system the lives of children are rife with a
level of instability and lack of control of day-to-day activities that children
living in their own homes do not face; these consequences follow directly
from state involvement. 03 The degree of restriction on liberty is magnified
for adolescents, 36% of whom are placed in group homes or institutions, not
in family settings.'0
Because the Court has made clear that "as a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel," 0 the fact
that the youth's physical liberty is impinged upon when placed in state care
is significant to the analysis.o 6 Furthermore, the unique restriction on a
youth's liberty resulting from placement in state-sponsored foster care has
constitutional implications above and beyond the connection between the
restriction of physical liberty and the right to counsel. This is important
because the Court demonstrated in Lassiter that when loss of interests that
have constitutional magnitude-such as the fundamental right to family integrity-are involved, there may be a constitutional right to counsel even if
physical liberty is not at risk. To the degree that youth in the child welfare
system are exposed to proceedings where their constitutional interests are
put at risk, counsel may be required to protect those interests. It is this
restriction of liberty that creates an interest held by the youth in appropriate
treatment and care by the state. While the Supreme Court has not yet
reached this issue, it indicated in Deshaney that placement in foster care is

sue focuses on high levels of placement instability in the child welfare system, as well as its
long-term consequences for children in terms of hard skills such as education and likelihood of
achieving permanency and family and exiting the system.
102 Peter J. Pecora, Why Should Child Welfare Focus on Promoting Placement Stability?,
in CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES IN CHILD WELFARE, UNIV. OF MINN. SCH. OF Soc. WORK,
CW360': Promoting Placement Stability 4,4-5 (2010), availableat http://www.cehd.umn.edu/
ssw/cascw/attributes/PDF/publications/CW360_2010.pdf.
0 See, e.g., LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (noting negative outcomes from prolonged stays in care); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp.
1387, 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting harm from multiple placements); Braam ex rel. Braam v.
State, 81 P.3d 851, 854 & n.l (Wash. 2003) (noting that frequent movement of children in
foster care "may create or exacerbate existing psychological conditions, notably reactive attachment disorder").
'" ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., KIDS COUNT DATA SNAPSHOT ON FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS
2 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/-/media/Pubs/Initiatives/KIDS%20COUNT/D/Data
SnapshotFosterCarePlcmnt/DataSnapshotFinalWeb.pdf.
05Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981).
1 The Court has held that even in the case of prosecution of petty offenses, if imprisonment is imposed, there is a constitutional right to counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 40 (1972); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) ("[Tlhe prospect of
imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or
'petty' matter, and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation.").
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substantially similar to the "incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty." 10'
Moreover, a majority of federal courts of appeals have found that foster
care places sufficient limits on the child's liberty to invoke due process protections; that is, the state has an affirmative duty of care to children in foster
care under the Fourteenth Amendment.108 It is the State's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act on her own behalf that is the
"deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process
Clause.'0 Children by nature do not have the same capacity as adults to
seek alternative means of care and subsistence both due to their minority
(inability to sign contracts, work in many situations, consent to many things
needed for health and welfare) and lack of experience. Their reliance on a
custodian-in this case the state-for care is not just by virtue of the restriction of their physical liberty but also of their minority.
2.

Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Interest and Degree to Which
Enhanced Protections Will Reduce Risk

The great risk of an erroneous deprivation-the second prong of the
Mathews analysis-of a youth's interest in the outcome of child welfare matters comes from several sources: the legally complex nature of the proceedings, the realities of the juvenile court, the inability and impropriety of other
parties representing the interest of the youth, and the nature of a youth's
understanding and decision-making discussed in Part I above. These factors
make the risk of error exceedingly high and make providing youth independent counsel a prime strategy for reducing the risk of error.

10 Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989). The
Court also stated:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free
society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a
situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to
an affirmative duty to protect. Indeed, several Courts of Appeals have held, by analogy to Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976),] and Youngberg [v. Romeo, 457 U.S.

307 (1982),] that the State may be held liable under the Due Process Clause for
failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of their
foster parents.
Id.

108See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (declaring that like the plaintiff in Youngberg, foster children are "involuntarily placed ... in a
custodial environment, and . .. unable to seek alternative living arrangements"); see also Doe
ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 175 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); Nicini
v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 989
F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662,
674-75
10 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
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a. Realities of the Child Welfare System

Today, the most crucial decisions about the fate of youth and their parents coming into contact with the child welfare system are made in the courtroom. The oversight role of the Court in child welfare matters has increased
in the last thirty years, resulting in the Court addressing "a greater complexity of issues and an increased number of hearings."" 0 Child protection and
child welfare proceedings are, by design, complicated, multi-step proceedings that are tailored to balance child safety and the rights of parents."' The
court makes decisions about the legal rights as well as the day-to-day life of
the child and family. The procedures and substance of child welfare proceedings come from federal" 2 and state child welfare law and case law.
As the Court demonstrated in Gault, the realities of the juvenile court
must be "candidly appraised" to arrive at an accurate determination of what
process is due to children who are at the center of these proceedings." 3 All
of these important decisions must be made in the context of usually crowded
courtrooms and dockets, overworked case workers, and highly emotional
proceedings.11 4 Moreover, these proceedings are often typified by standards
such as "best interests" that are potentially vague and provide the court with
much discretion in the decisions that are made.' In addition to the informal
and insular nature of these proceedings, they are typically closed to the public, which eliminates a potential source of accountability." 6 The risk of an
erroneous result is inherent in the system, requiring special attention to due
process protections that will provide accountability."'
"o Kathleen S. Bean, Changingthe Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV.

U. L. REv. 1, 42 (2001).
"' See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
112 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 670-79 (West 2011) (Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,
which has been amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act and most recently by the
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (West 2011) (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which requires as a condition of federal funding for states to have systems to respond to reports of child
abuse,3 including the provision of guardians ad litem to all children in dependency matters).
" in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
114 Bean, supra note 110, at 49-55 (describing many of the forces, such as overcrowded
dockets, informality in proceedings, imbalance in power between the state and other parties,
and emotionally charged proceedings, that risk inaccurate and inequitable results); see also
Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional Culture
of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 55 (2010) (exploring the impact of family court culture on the assertion of
rights among parents and children); Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate?":A Critique
of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339 (1999) (discussing

how the informality of dependency court often exacerbates the power imbalance between parent and state and does not necessarily result in accurate fact finding and results).
" Pitchal, supra note 66, at 687-88.
116

ENT

Bean, supra note 110, at 1-3; see also MICHAEL DALE,

§ 4.19(2) (1987).

REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLI-

117The risks are especially high for older foster youth who are close to "aging out" of the
system. The proceedings that involve adolescents vary in kind and each presents significant

2012]
b.

The Legal Significance of Adolescent Development

549

The Role of Counsel in Reducing the Risk of Error

The risk that the juvenile court will not reach the most accurate decision
and most appropriate disposition can be significant because of the complicated nature of the proceedings and the impact of the typical context of juvenile court."'
An attorney following the standards of practice, as well as the traditional codes of ethics," 9 such as those enumerated in the ABA Model Act
Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings,12 0 is in the best position to ensure that the risk of error is
reduced from the child's perspective. Under the Model Act, counsel must
take on all the traditional roles of a lawyer-zealous advocacy, undivided
loyalty, confidentiality-as well as a particular obligation to and understanding of child development.121 This understanding includes an obligation not
only to try to maintain the traditional attorney-client relationship to the
greatest extent possible but also to acknowledge that in certain areas or for
youth of a certain age their clients may be operating with a diminished capacity to make decisions, something to which counsel must adjust.122
Without counsel, the youth is left simply to be a subject of the proceedings without having any real voice. Especially when a youth is nearing the
age of majority, her interests may not be represented by others such as the
parent, the social worker, or a guardian ad litem simply because these parties

risks to unrepresented youth. The nature of these proceedings change as youths age. The
stakes are different, and the consequences of immature decisions-such as whether to remain
in foster care-may be irrevocable. Thus, while all teens have interests in the nature, intensity,
and duration of services they receive from the child welfare system, these considerations are
accentuated for older teens. These youths have long been entitled to special planning to help
them make a smooth transition to adulthood. Pitchal, supra note 66, at 687-88. More recently
with the enactment of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (2008), states have greater ability than ever before to
create more options and support for older youth in care. These options may include a right to
return to care after leaving the child welfare system. In large part, these youth are discharged
due to age-"aging out"-not because they are moving to permanency such as reunification
or adoption. For that reason, this plan is to describe how this young person will sustain herself
on her own without the support of a family or the child welfare system. Many of the decisions
made for and by youth who are aging out of care will be irrevocable and thus the advice of
counsel is particularly important. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(1)(D) (West 2011) (stating that for a
child age sixteen or older, the case plan must include a written description of the programs and
services which will help the child prepare for the transition from foster care to independent
living).
H' See, e.g., Bruce A. Boyer, JurisdictionalConflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child
Welfare Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between InstitutionalCo-Parents,54 MD. L. REV.
377, 377 (1995) ("Juvenile courts, particularly in large urban areas, have been swamped by
increasing caseloads that challenge their ability to provide effective oversight of dependent,
neglected, and abused children.").
19
' See MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.14 cmt. (1983).
120 ABA MODEL Acr, supra note 21.
121 Id. § 7 (duties).
122 Id. § 7(d) (diminished capacity); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTY R. 1.14
(1983).
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have other interests to protect, in addition to those of the youth.123 This can
result in the court not being fully apprised of the youth's living situation,
needs, or perspective regarding the plan the child welfare agency is putting
in place, which could result in the court making a determination that neither
meets the needs of the child nor moves the youth and family toward permanency. However, when a youth has an attorney to represent her interests
independently of those of the other parties, the court can have confidence
that the youth's position is being presented and that the parties are not compromised by having to divide their loyalties. Courts have acknowledged that
having zealous legal advocacy for the child, parent, and state serves the interests of all parties and produces results in which the courts have
confidence:
The matter of independent representation by counsel, so that a
child may have his own attorney when his welfare is at stake, is
the most significant and practical reform that can be made in the
area of children and the law. The rights and sometimes the interests of children are frequently jeopardized in court proceedings
because the best interests of a child are determined without resort
to an independent advocate for the child. Courts may fail to perceive children will be affected by the outcome of the litigation, or
that potential conflicts between the interests of the children and the
interests of other parties require that the child have separate counsel. Too often the judge assumes the child's interests are adequately protected by [the child welfare agency]. This.position is
undermined when, as here, [the child welfare agency] is challenged and as such it becomes an interested party, the source of the

inquiry.124
As the Gault Court articulated, even more than adults, a child needs the
"guiding hand of counsel" given her developmental capacities. 125 Counsel's
role is central in these proceedings: Counsel helps the child understand the
process and consequences and guides the child in making decisions that best
represent the child's position. In addition, many dependent children are
"status offenders," that is, youth who may be ungovernable, truant, or runaways.126 Gault holds sway here because prior to the Juvenile Justice and

123 See Pitchal, supra note 66, at 678, 685, 688-90 for a more comprehensive discussion
of the interests that the parent and state are likely to have that could be at odds with those of
the child.
12 In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 470 (Okla. 1980).
123In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
126 While a majority of states create a separate legal category for status offenders, such as
"child in need of supervision" or "person in need of supervision," a minority of states treat
status offenders like other dependent children. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 21
(West 2011) (defining children in need of services to include those who have committed status
offenses such as running away and being incorrigible, treating them as non-delinquent of-
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Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,127 these youth were typically categorized as delinquent.'28 Under Gault, they were afforded a right to counsel
because they were subject to the same loss of liberty as delinquents.129 Even
independent of the Mathews analysis, application of Gault requires that these
youth have a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel.
To a large degree, arriving at an equitable result in dependency court
rests on solid and accurate factual findings, which depend upon professional
and skilled presentations-the stock and trade of competent counsel.13 0 Accurate fact-finding is important to the determination of whether the child
should enter the child welfare system at all and, if she is in the system, what
living arrangement and services would be best for her. There has been substantial litigation over the conditions of confinement and adequacy of services as well as damage actions for injury to children while in foster care.' 3 '
The importance of this advocacy is even clearer given that several federal
appellate courts considering child welfare matters have limited class-action
lawsuits on abstention grounds.13 2
Counsel is further necessary in dependency proceedings to ensure that
the court makes accurate findings of fact, especially given the substantial
potential consequences of being placed in foster care. Under Mathews, improving fact-finding is one of the central inquiries of the due process analysis.'33 Just as in delinquency proceedings, counsel in child welfare matters is
integral to arriving at accurate fact-finding that helps to ensure that decisions
about a youth's removal from the home and subsequent case decisions that
the court makes are based on the most accurate information.
The Court in Lassiter stated, almost as a truism, that representation of
the relevant legal interests in dependency matters results in more accurate
and, therefore, more just results. 3 4 The duties of a youth's attorney, informed by research on adolescent and child development, put counsel in the
fenses); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (West 2011) (defining a dependent child to include a
child who is truant or incorrigible).
127 Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974).
128

See generally Gwen A. Holden & Robert A. Kapler, Deinstitutionalizing Status Of-

fenders: A Record of Progress, 2 Juv. JusT. 3 (1995) (describing the mandate of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to deinstitutionalize juvenile status offenders
as a condition of receipt of federal funding).
129 Gault, 387 U.S. at
41.
30

1 See generally SHERRIE BOURG CARTER, CHILDREN IN THE COURTROOM: CHALLENGES
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (2d ed. 2009); JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (3d ed. 2007); MARVIN VENTRELL, TIuAL ADVOCACY FOR THE CHILD WELFARE LAWYER: TELLING THE STORY OF
THE FAMILY (2011).
'3' See Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v.
Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C.
1995); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
132 See Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003); J.B. ex rel. Hart v.
Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999) (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction on federal claims because of ongoing statutorily required review hearings in juvenile court).
13 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
134 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
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best position to reduce the risk of error in protecting the child's interest and
producing more just results.'
3.

Governmental Interest

In the final prong of the Mathews test, a court must-consider "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."' 6 The state has an interest in accurate decision-making regarding the nature, intensity, and duration of a youth's placement. Indeed,
the state has an "urgent interest in the welfare of the child" and therefore in
"an accurate and just decision."' 7 The accuracy of these decisions depends
on many factors, including the youth's appreciation of the choices before
her, her willingness to participate in court-ordered programs, her feelings of
safety and respect while in care, and her ambitions, needs, and insights. All
of these are the sorts of factors that lawyers are well-suited to present to the
court-indeed, they are less likely to get before the court if the presentation
is left to a case worker or other adult.
Also implicated in the government's interest is the additional cost the
government will have to bear if all youth have a constitutional right to counsel in dependency proceedings.' "This includes the administrative burden
135 The court in Kenny A. described the limitations of other child welfare actors that made
counsel for children in a position most likely to reduce error in these proceedings:
Contrary to County Defendants' argument, juvenile court judges, court appointed
special advocates (CASAs), and citizen review panels do not adequately mitigate the
risk of such errors. Judges, unlike child advocate attorneys, cannot conduct their
own investigations and are entirely dependent on others to provide them information
about the child's circumstances. Similarly, citizen review panels must rely on facts
presented to them by state and county personnel, including local DFCS offices. As a
result, their reviews are only as good as the information provided to them by DFCS
and other state and local agencies. CASAs are also volunteers who do not provide
legal representation to a child. Moreover, CASAs are appointed in only a small
number of cases. The Court concludes that only the appointment of counsel can
effectively mitigate the risk of significant errors in deprivation and TPR proceedings.
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see also Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 29 n.5 (citing survey of New York Family Court judges in which 72.5% reported that it was
more difficult to conduct a fair hearing and 66.7% reported that it was more difficult to develop the facts when parents were not represented in termination of parental cases).

..
6 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
137 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
1 The actual "cost" of counsel for children is not itself clear. First, many advocates have
argued that effective representation of all parties can reduce long-term costs by reducing the
time a youth may spend in foster care by avoiding improper removals and expediting either
reunification or adoption. Several studies of the provision of representation for parents have
shown these common sense hypotheses to be valid. See, e.g., 2 JAMES BELL Assocs. INC.,
FEASIBILITY OF EVALUATING THE STATE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM § II.B, 24-25 (2003),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/statecip/volume2/ar 2b.htm; JASON A.
OETJEN, NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, IMPROVING PARENTs' REPRESENTATION IN DEPENDENCY CASES: A WASHINGTON STATE PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION

(2003), available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/Reports/Dependency%20&%20Termination%20
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and other societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter
of constitutional right, [counsel in dependency proceedings] ."39 "Financial
cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision."l40 While the cost of providing counsel to children in child welfare
matters is an issue of political importance, case law suggests that cost should
not be a factor of constitutionalconsequence.141 Financial cost must be considered along with the nature of the interest at stake in the proceeding. In its
analysis, the Court has indicated that cost cannot be a reason to withhold
procedural protections that are identified as necessary to protect an important constitutional right or to prevent its violation. While it will obviously
cost money to provide counsel, the child's interest is great enough 42 and the
risk of error is great enough,143 to overcome any governmental interest to the
contrary.'"

Reports/watabriefcolorfinal[l].pdf. One study of the representation of children by counsel
following the traditional attorney-client model also found that: i) youth represented in this
manner by The Foster Children's Project (FCP) had a significantly higher rate of exit to permanency than children not served due to much higher rates of adoption and long-term custody;
and ii) taking into consideration the estimated costs of substitute care, ongoing adoption subsidies, and FCP representation, the net cost of FCP associated with each additional day of permanency was estimated to be as low as $32. See ANDREw E. ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER,
EXPEDITING PERMANENCY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN PALM BEACH

CouNTY 1 (2008). Second, many states provide some form of an advocate for children in child
welfare matters, though not necessarily a lawyer who is obligated to play the traditional role of
an attorney with all associated ethical responsibilities. Already allocated funds could be
redeployed to fund the legal representation this Article argues is constitutionally required.
'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
140 Id. at 348.
1' See, e.g., id. at 347-49 (acknowledging the cost of providing pre-determination evidentiary hearings, but focusing on the fact that current procedures, including a pre-termination de
novo review, post-termination hearing, and judicial review, were sufficient to protect the interest at stake); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605-06, 613 (1979) (noting the cost of providing

more procedures prior to admitting children to inpatient mental health treatment, but holding
that procedural protections were sufficient largely based on the determination that "the independent medical decisionmaking process" in place was sufficient and that enhanced procedures were unlikely to arrive at a more accurate decision given the interests involved, which
included the interest of parents in controlling the treatment decisions of their children).
142 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (stating that the interest in
family integrity "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,

protection" (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))).
143 In Lassiter, the Mathews balancing would result in finding a constitutional right to
counsel for a parent in termination cases when "the complexity of the proceeding and the
incapacity of the uncounseled parent [was] . .. great enough to make the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high." Lassiter,452 U.S. at 31. As discussed
above, the proceedings will always be complex to a youth and the "incapacity" of a youth
based on developmental immaturity will always make the risk of error when uncounseled
insupportably high given the weight of the interests at stake.
'" In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court found the nature of the interest at
stake-cash assistance for the very poor-to be an important consideration in the due process

analysis. The Court found that the "governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources," while important, were "not overriding in the welfare context." Id. at 265,
266. The Court concluded that:
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Thus, the Court in Lassiter noted that while the state's fiscal interest
might not be served by mandating counsel for parents in termination proceedings because it would incur a cost, the Court concluded that "though the
State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to
overcome the private interests as important as those here ... ."145 Cost was

not presented as significant in leading the Lassiter Court to its holding that
counsel was not constitutionally required in all termination cases. Rather,
the holding flows, in large part, from: a) the Court's evaluation that the risk
of error would not be unreasonably high in all cases, 146 and b) the presumption against the right to counsel in cases where the state did not restrict
physical liberty.147
The Court reiterated the Lassiter analysis in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., where the
Court evaluated whether due process and equal protection required the provision of transcripts without cost when obtaining the transcripts was a condition of appealing a termination of parental rights.148 The Court stated that
"we inspect the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on
49
the one hand, and the State's justification for its exaction, on the other."
Cost is thus a factor that can be overcome.
The Court's analysis of cost in Lassiterindicates that the cost of providing counsel would not preclude a finding that due process requires the provision of counsel for teens in dependency matters for several reasons. First,
similar to Lassiter, the fundamental right to family integrity is involved in
dependency matters for children. Distinct from, and in addition to parents'
interests, the child has another fundamental right at stake-the Fourteenth
Amendment right to care and protection while in state care, as described
above. As in Lassiter,protection of these interests colors the assessment of
cost, reducing its constitutional significance.

[Tihe interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance,
coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated,
clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal
and administrative burdens. As the District Court correctly concluded, "[t]he stakes
are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or
irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully informed of the case against him so that he
may contest its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal."
Id. at 266 (citations omitted). In child welfare matters, the stakes are similarly high for children who may be separated from family and placed in foster care or remaining in abusive
homes, and the risk of error too high for a youth to remain without counsel. These combined
interests overcome countervailing governmental interests such as cost.
" Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
46
1 Id. at 31-32.
147 Id.
48

149
1

at 26-27.

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
Id. at 120-21.
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

A. The Establishment of the Right: In re Gault
Unlike in the child welfare context, children in the juvenile justice system have a right to counsel under In re Gault.s0 Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gault, counsel was deemed unnecessary for youth as
proceedings were informal and not adversarial."' Furthermore, the primary
focus of court involvement was to determine the child's best interests and
probation officers and judges were considered the protectors of children's
rights. Gault established that the stakes in juvenile court were too high for
informality. Procedural protections must be present, including the right to
counsel.
The question then becomes whether youth also have a constitutional
right to waive their right to counsel. Attorneys play a critical role in ensuring that the adversarial system produces "just results,"5 2 and that an accused's constitutional and statutory rights are respected. Gault recognized a
juvenile's right to counsel not because it was a right specifically guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights-as opposed to the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination-but because the right to counsel was essential to the due
process required of any court proceeding.'53 The Supreme Court in Gault
stated:
[T]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist
upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has
a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child 'requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him.1 54
Today, the need for the assistance of counsel in juvenile court is even more
important, as greater numbers of youth are at risk of adult prosecution, dispositions have become longer and more punitive, and delinquency adjudications carry collateral consequences that follow the youth into adulthood and,
in some cases, for the rest of their lives.' 5 Of equal if not greater importance, as the stakes in juvenile court have risen, social science research has
150387 U.S.

1, 47 (1967).
"' See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffilesllojjdpl178995.pdf.
152 Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).

.. Gault, 387 U.S. at 39; see also Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to
Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 639 (2002).
' Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
'" See PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE AcTION NETWORK, THE PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CHECKLIST (2010), available at http://www.
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confirmed that most youth lack the capacity, on their own, to fully appreciate the nature of those stakes and to make intelligent decisions about how to
navigate the increasingly complex dimensions of the modem juvenile
court.156
Attorneys are necessary to help young clients invoke their due process
rights, hold the state to its burden of proof, advocate for fair dispositions,
appeal adverse rulings, and protect their clients' interests while incarcerated
or on probation.'57 Counsel's involvement during the pretrial phase of a juvenile case is critical to obtaining a favorable outcome for her client."' With
counsel, juveniles are more likely to receive fair hearings. Counsel can advise about pre-trial motions to suppress statements or evidence, issues of
which few teens will even be aware. Counsel provides guidance about plea
agreements and their consequences-both direct and collateral. At hearings,
counsel can adequately confront and cross-examine witnesses. The attorneys can also provide a juvenile guidance on whether to pursue appellate
remedies and advice on when and how to expunge her juvenile record.
Without counsel, the risk of unfairness increases dramatically.5 9 Juveniles
as a class are ill-equipped to understand, manage, and navigate the complexities of the system on their own. The research on adolescent development
discussed below demonstrates that youth misunderstand the legal system and
need the assistance of lawyers to advise them not only of their rights but also
of the process they are undergoing. Youth need lawyers to ensure that the
rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court system is primary and that the youth
have access to programs, services, and opportunities designed to meet their
individual needs for treatment and rehabilitation. They also need attorneys
to ensure that discharge and release occur in a timely and appropriate manner. With the increasingly punitive consequences imposed on youth, lawyers are necessary to ensure the punitive edge does not obscure the court's
rehabilitative purpose.'6
pacourts.us/NR/rdonlyres/C7EC3A2C-FC73-4820-AC93-A48AIB5B ID50/0/CollateralConsequencesChecklist.pdf.

See Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful OfYouTH ON TRIAL, supra note 12, at 73-103.
.' Gault, 387 U.S. at 39 n.65.
"' PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., AM. BAR Ass'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 32 (1995). Moreover, to ensure that a child is fully aware of the importance of
counsel, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends that when a
child is served with a summons, information should also be provided to the child and his or her
family as to why counsel for the youth is important, and what the child's options are for
obtaining legal representation prior to the adjudication hearing. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVE116

fenders, in

NILE AND

FAMILY COURT

JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT

1, 74 (2005), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/
sites/default/files/juveniledelinquencyguidelinescompressed[1].pdf.
11 The Luzerne County scandal, discussed below, is an acute example.
'6 Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 175, 182 (2007).
PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES
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Adolescent Development in the Delinquency Context

In today's juvenile court, a judge typically conducts a colloquy in the
courtroom to effectuate the juvenile's waiver of counsel.16 1 Many states permit parents to waive their child's right to counsel or require the juvenile to be
counseled by her parent prior to waiving her right to counsel.'62 Few states
place the waiver decision completely on the child.'16
However, the waiver decision becomes more complicated when the
youth is required to act in the presence of her parents or the judge. Especially when faced with a decision in the presence of an authority figure,
"[a]dolescents are more likely than young adults to make choices that reflect a propensity to comply with authority figures."M Scholarship on moral
development explains why a juvenile would be more inclined than an adult
to acquiesce to authority. Adolescence is marked by "conventional" morality-"conforming to and upholding the rules and expectations and conventions of society or authority just because they are society's rules,
expectations, or conventions."' 65 Youth are likely to go along with a suggestion to waive counsel because a probation officer has told them the charges
are minimal and they will not need an attorney, or because their parents have
told them that they should just take the easy route and appear without counsel. This susceptibility to coercion heightens the need for assistance of
counsel in juvenile proceedings such that the right should be unwaivable.
Furthermore, in order to meaningfully participate in the legal system,
one must have certain cognitive and emotional capacities that young people
typically lack.166 The psychological and developmental factors of adolescence merely exacerbate this disadvantage. For over thirty years, forensic
psychologists have tried to determine whether juveniles can understand and
comprehend the complexities of their rights in the legal system. The findings are consistent across the board-juveniles frequently misunderstand
their legal rights.167 In fact, most juveniles misconstrue the very concept of a
16I Although there is much debate over the effectiveness of the oral or written colloquy,
discussion of this debate is outside the scope of this Article.
162 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
169-B:12
(2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 2011); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165.
163 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140 (West 2012) (providing right
to waive
counsel to juvenile twelve years of age or older); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.23 (West 2011) ("A
juvenile 15 years of age or older may waive counsel ....
); UTAH R. Juv. P. 26(e) ("A minor
14 years of age and older is presumed capable of intelligently comprehending and waiving the
minor's right to counsel ....
).
'" Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents and Adults' Capacitiesas Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357 (2003).
165

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE AND
VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES 172-73 (1984).
1 Michele Peterson-Badali & Rona Abramovich, Grade Related Changes in Young People's Reasoning About Plea Decisions, 17 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 537, 537 (1993) (noting that

these capacities typically increase with age).
67
1 See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43; THOMAS GRIsso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF
RIGirrs: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981).

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

558

[Vol. 47

right,believing that it is conditional and can be later revoked by the judge.' 8
Even if a juvenile can demonstrate an accurate understanding of her rights
and the legal process, she often fails to appreciate how the rights apply to her
own circumstances or the consequences of waiving those rights.16 9
In addition to cognitive levels that affect a youth's ability to understand
and process information so that she can make thoughtful decisions, youth are
also present-oriented,o70 which affects their ability to interact with counsel
and thus interferes with the effectiveness of their representation. A youth's
focus on the immediate makes intuitive sense-adolescents have had less
experience with long-term consequences due to their age and they may be
uncertain about what the future holds for them. In the context of waiving
rights, one commentator has noted that the court must assess the child's
"cognitive ability to determine: (1) [W]hether the child processed the information received about the rights involved; (2) whether the child engaged in
rational decision making; and (3) whether the child waived the right volitionally."' 7' Without this thorough analysis or counseling as to the importance of the right to counsel, juveniles are more likely to believe, to their
detriment, that the right is revocable by the justice system.
The Contours of the Constitutional Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Justice Matters

C.

1.

The FarettaRight to Self-Representation

Proponents of juvenile waiver of counsel suggest that waiver is a
"right" protected by the Federal Constitution, relying upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Faretta v. California.172 However, an analysis of Faretta
in light of adolescent development research and subsequent case law makes
clear that there is no juvenile right to waiver of counsel or self-representation. In Farettav. California,the Supreme Court held that an adult criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel implies a right to self-representation. 73 Notably, the Court held that the Constitution required a right of
self-representation, not necessarily the right to waive counsel and proceed

168 See,

e.g., Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths' Capacitiesas Trial Defend-

ants, in YoUTH

ON TRIAL,

supra note 12, at 139, 148; Jodi L. Viljoen, Patricia A. Zapf &

Ronald Roesch, Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants: A Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 1 (2007).

169 See Peterson-Badali, supra note 166, at 547, 549-50 (finding that there was no difference in an adolescent's decision to plead guilty based on the seriousness of the charges, thus
suggesting a lack of awareness of the implications for punishment).
170Scott,

Evaluating Adolescent Decision-Making in Legal Contexts, supra note 14, at

231.

'31Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1896 (1996).
172422
173

U.S. 806, 836 (1975).

Id. at 819.
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without a defense. 17 4 An adult defendant who chooses to proceed pro se is
not dispensing with the protections of the Sixth Amendment. The Court
views the waiver of an attorney not as the abandonment of a right, but as the
assertion of a separate and competing right-a demand to "make one's own
defense personally."17 1 In these situations, the Sixth Amendment's protections are still in full force. It is thus a choice of the manner of defense, not a
choice to have no defense at all.
The FarettaCourt rested its holding upon the language and history of
the Sixth Amendment as well as English and Colonial case law.16 Prior to
the late 1600s, self-representation was the only means of representation for
accused individuals."' Once counsel was provided to defendants, the ability
to conduct one's own defense was still carefully protected. 7 1
However, the right to self-representation expressed in Faretta is not
unfettered. Courts in criminal cases "are reluctant to grant a waiver unless
the accused understands the nature of the charge and its statutory requirements, the range of punishments, the possible defenses and circumstances of
mitigation."l 79 A court may impose standby counsel upon a criminal defendant who wishes to conduct her own defense.'o Additionally, standby counsel's uninvited participation in the proceedings is constitutionally
permissible, so long as the participation is not such as to destroy a jury's
perception that the defendant retains control over her own defense.'"' The
right of self-representation is not absolute; "the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer." 82

174 See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) ("[A]n individual's decision to represent himself is no longer compelled by the necessity of choosing self-representation over incompetent or nonexistent representation; rather, it more likely reflects a genuine
desire to 'conduct his own cause in his own words."' (quoting Faretta,422 U.S. at 823)).
" Faretta,422 U.S. at 819. See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)
("Faretta 's [sic] holding was based on the long-standing recognition of a right of self-representation in federal and most state courts . . .
7
6 Faretta,422 U.S. at 818.
"7 Id. at 823-24.
"7 Id. at 825. The importance of self-representation, the Court explained, was even more
fervently defended in the colonies, where attorneys were viewed as being "bent on the conviction of those who opposed the King's prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions."
Id. at 826 (quoting CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 7 (1911)).
'79Mlyniec, supra note 8, § I (citing Faretta,422 U.S. at 806).
"s McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 188.
"' Id. at 179. The Court in McKaskle stated that:

Faretta rights are adequately vindicated in proceedings outside the presence
jury if the pro se defendant is allowed to address the court freely on his own
and if disagreements between counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved
defendant's favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left
discretion of counsel.
Id.

I" Martinez

v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000).

of the
behalf
in the
to the
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The Supreme Court significantly limited the scope of the Farettarule in
its recent decision in Indiana v. Edwards.183 In Edwards, the defendant had
undergone numerous competency hearings and was finally deemed competent to stand trial but incompetent to represent himself.' " On appeal, Edwards claimed that this denial violated his right to self-representation, as
declared in Faretta. The Court held that the Constitution permits a state to
limit the right of self-representation by evaluating the defendant's mental
capacity to conduct his own defense.' In holding that a state may deny a
defendant the right to self-representation based upon mental capacity, the
Edwards Court highlighted the difference in the assessment of competence
to stand trial and competence to conduct one's own defense, finding that
states may take realistic account of the mental capacities of individuals and
insist upon representation.' 6 As such, the Faretta right is inapplicable to
individuals who have compromised mental capacities and limited abilities to
handle, without assistance, the complexities of trial and selfrepresentation.'
a.

The Importance of History to the Right of Self-Representation

The FarettaCourt relied extensively on the history of criminal proceedings-dating to English common law-to find support for the right to selfrepresentation.' 8 Specifically, the Court looked to the entrenched practice
of ensuring defendants' ability to conduct their own defense. The importance of history in the Court's decision is underscored by the Court's holding
in Martinez v. Court of Appeal.'"8

There the Supreme Court held that the

right to represent oneself did not extend to direct appeal, stating, "unlike the
inquiry in Faretta,the historical evidence does not provide any support for
an affirmative constitutional right to appellate self-representation."'"'

183554

U.S. 164 (2008).

'8 Id. at 167-69.
'I Id. at 174.
86
' Id. at 175-78.

s' We are not suggesting that youth are incompetent because of mental illness, rather that,
because of developmental immaturity, they lack capacities that are similar to the shortcomings
of adults who are incompetent because of mental illness. See generally Grisso et al., supra
note 164.
88 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975). It should not be overlooked that, even
in the criminal context, this foundation has been subsequently questioned by the Supreme
Court. In Martinez, the Court concluded:
Therefore, while Faretta is correct in concluding that there is abundant support for
the proposition that a right to self-representation has been recognized for centuries,
the original reasons for protecting that right do not have the same force when the
availability of competent counsel for every indigent defendant has displaced the
need-although not always the desire-for self-representation.
Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 158 (2000).
'89528 U.S. 152.
' Id. at 159.
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The unique history of juvenile courts requires a much different focus in
discussing waiver of counsel. Historically, children possessed no independent rights, only the duty to serve and obey their parents."' Under the doctrine of parenspatriae,states acted in loco parentis-assumingthe custodial

responsibilities of parents. Accordingly, the deprivation of liberty by the
state was legally viewed as nothing more than a logical extension of the
natural and inherent control possessed by parents.192 While this concept had
no support in the history of criminal law, these theories of state control over
children served as the theoretical foundation for juvenile courts.193
Even as juveniles' rights evolved, history is replete with denials of basic
procedural due process. As stated in Gault, "the highest motives and most
enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our
law in any comparable context." 94 Over sixty years after the formation of
the first juvenile court in 1899, the Court held that the Constitution required
the juvenile right to counsel.195 While the fundamental procedural requirements mandated by Gault marked a significant shift in the practice and formalization of juvenile courts, the implementation of this right did not happen
uniformly or promptly.'96

For example, see Brown v. EMA, in which Justice Thomas stated in his dissent:
The law [at the time of the Revolution] entitled parents to "the custody of their
[children]," "the value of th[e] [children's] labor and services," and the "right to
the exercise of such discipline as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred
trust." Children, in turn, were charged with "obedience and assistance during their
own minority, and gratitude and reverance during the rest of their lives."
191

131 S. Ct. 2729, 2757 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing CHANCELLOR
JAMES KENr, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 193, 203, 207 (1889)).
192

For example, see Ex parte Crouse:

As to abridgment of indefeasible rights by confinement of the person, it is no more
than what is borne, to a greater or less extent, in every school; and we know of no
natural right to exemption from restraints which conduce to an infant's welfare. Nor
is there a doubt of the propriety of their application in the particular instance. The
infant has been snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity; and, not only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it would be an act of
extreme cruelty to release her from it.
4 Whart. 9, 11-12 (Pa. 1839).
193 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) ("[There is no trace of the [parens patriael
doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children under seven were
considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to
arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders.").
94
'
Id. at 17.
1s Id. at 29-30.
'6 See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185,
1189 (1989) (discussing surveys and research regarding the appearance of attorneys in juvenile
matters); Barry C. Feld, In re: Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRiM. & DELNQ. 393, 401 (1988) (showing that in half of the
six states surveyed, only 37.5%, 47.7%, and 52.7% of the juveniles were represented).
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The Inapplicabilityof Farettato Juveniles

While the criminal courts have a history of self-representation, the juvenile system has a history of non-representation. 191 Historically, the benevolent arm of the state was presumably the only protection the juvenile
needed.'19 As juvenile courts became increasingly more punitive and as the
sanctions available against juveniles came to mirror those available against
adults, this presumption of non-representation became obsolete. The right to
counsel was one of the first constitutional rights guaranteed to juvenile defendants, as counsel is the primary vehicle through which youth can realize
the full array of constitutional rights available to them.199 The FarettaCourt
also relied on the language of the Sixth Amendment in reaching its holding.
Specifically, the Court found that the right to self-representation is "necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment."2 u However, only
some requirements of the Sixth Amendment, such as the right to confront
witnesses and the right to counsel,2 0 1 have been applied to juveniles.2 02
These rights have been derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of due process, 03 extending the fair administration .of justice to juvenile
court proceedings.2 04
Moreover, the Court in Faretta clearly limits its holding to defendants
in criminal trials. 205 The Supreme Court has never equated juvenile matters
with criminal proceedings.2 6 The Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvaniaheld that juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury trial. 2 07
This is important, not only because of the applicable limits the Court placed
on the extension of the Sixth Amendment but also because of the focus the
'" See Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 ("[P]roceedings involving juveniles were described as 'civil'
not 'criminal' and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it
seeks to deprive a person of his liberty." (footnote omitted)).
'9' As the Gault Court observed:

The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly
judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his
problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations,
benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help "to save
him from a downward career."
Id. at 25-26 (citation omitted).
'"
Id. at 36.
2
'"Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
201 Id.

202 The Court in Gault found the source of these rights for juveniles in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41-43.
203See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
20 Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
205 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 ("It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.... The
defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a
conviction.").
2" See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541 ("[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
held to be a criminal prosecution .

20 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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Court has placed on the importance of the right to represent oneself before a
20 8
jury :

Farettarights are adequately vindicated in proceedings outside the
presence of the jury if the pro se defendant is allowed to address
the court freely on his own behalf and if disagreements between
[mandated standby] counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved
in the defendant's favor whenever the matter is one that would
normally be left to the discretion of counsel.2 "
As previously discussed, the scope of the Farettaright to self-representation has been substantially limited. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that it is constitutionally permissible to limit this right in situations
where an adult defendant is competent to stand trial but whose ability to
represent herself is compromised by severe mental illness.2 10 In Edwards,
the Court cited the American Psychiatric Association amicus curiae brief,
explaining the importance of a different rule: "[D]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities,
[and] anxiety ... can impair the defendant's ability to play the significantly
expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser
role of represented defendant."21 ' The Court explained, "insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, selfrepresentation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the
Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial."212 The Supreme Court has made similar findings regarding the mental capacities of
juveniles in the context of sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons,213 the Court
held that the death penalty may not constitutionally be applied to individuals
who committed offenses when they were under the age of eighteen, citing
the "diminished capacity" of juveniles.2 14 The Court stated:
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, '[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found
in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions.' 2 15

208 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 179 (1984).
2

0

210
211
2 12

Id.

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
Id. at 176 (citation omitted).

Id. at 176-77.

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 571 ("Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident
that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to
adults.").
15 Id. at 568 (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993)).
213

214
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The Effect of Juvenile Waiver

The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
operate identically for juveniles as it does for adults.2 16 This is true of the
waiver of rights, as well as the exercise of those rights. "To preserve the
protection of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed defendants, we indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights."217
A youth's waiver of counsel is almost never a signal that the youth wants to
act as her own lawyer in trying the case. The exercise of a right to represent
oneself is far different from the waiver of a right to be represented by a
trained professional. More often, in juvenile court, the waiver of counsel is
a precursor to an admission of guilt. The literature of adolescent development has taught us that youth are unlikely to understand substantive criminal
law.218 They will not appreciate, for example, that a lawyer might make the
case for "simple," rather than "aggravated" assault. They will not understand the intricacies and complexities of the entire judicial process.
The recent scandal in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania2 19 highlights the
importance for youth of ensuring an unwaivable right to counsel.2 20 Children
in Luzerne County were pawns in a kickback scheme where two judges conspired to send the juveniles to a private placement facility for their own
pecuniary gain. This occurred primarily because juveniles routinely appeared without attorneys; the rate of waiver of counsel in Luzerne County
was well over the state average.2 21 Youth who waived counsel were three
times more likely to be placed out of their homes than youth who had lawyers. 22 2 In many instances, these unrepresented youth were adjudicated delinquent and placed in residential care for minor offenses or for conduct not
rising to the level of a crime. These delinquency sanctions were of indeterminate nature. Even when youth were placed on probation, they lacked
zealous advocates to negotiate either the conditions of probation or its duration. 223 Many youth who were placed in programs that did not match their
needs "failed to adjust," entering a revolving door that continually returned
216
217

218
219

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (emphasis added).
See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43; GRISSO, supra note 167.

See In re J.V.R., No. 81 M.M. 2008, 2010 Pa. LEXIS 2330 (Pa. Oct. 13, 2010); H.T. v.

Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-0357, consolidated as No. 3:09-cv-0286, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87774 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010). For a further discussion of the Luzeme County scandal and
its lessons for implementing the right to counsel, see Robert Schwartz & Marsha Levick, When
a "Right" Is Not Enough: Implementation of the Right to Counsel in an Age of Ambivalence, 9
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 365 (2010).
220 For background information and all pleadings, see Luzerne Kids-for-Cash Scandal, JuVENILE LAW CENTER (Mar. 5, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.jlc.org/current-initiatives/promoting-faimess-courtsluzeme-kids-cash-scandal.
221 Master Complaint at
689, H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-0357, consolidated as No.
3:09-cv-0286 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2009).
22 2
Id. at [J 688-89.
223 Id. passim.
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them to juvenile court where they received harsher and longer

dispositions. 2 24
In Luzerne County, the absence of counsel also meant that youth could
not challenge the corrupt judge's repeated violations of other significant
rights. For example, the judge failed to ensure that children's guilty pleas
were knowing and voluntary. 225 He regularly failed to inform youth of their
right to a trial, their right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
government's burden of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt.226 He regularly failed to ask if youth understood that they were
giving up these rights before pleading guilty.2 27 He did nothing to confirm
that youth understood the offenses to which they were pleading guilty. 228
Although what occurred in Luzerne County was in many ways an aberration,
229
it was able to occur because of the absence of attorneys in the courtroom.
In Luzerne County, failing to provide an unwaivable right to counsel
was tied to the inevitable admission that followed. In this corrupt courtroom, youth routinely answered "yes" when asked, "[d]id you do this?"
This is problematic and unfair for several reasons. Like Gerald Gault, the
youth did not have the protections of counsel to advise them of the consequences of admitting to their offenses. Youth without counsel may be influenced by probation officers, prosecutors, or judges, none of whom are in a
position to provide disinterested advice nor have professional obligations to
do

So.

230

Indeed, the anecdotes we have heard from youth in Luzerne County
include examples of prosecutors advising youth and their families prior to
trial. Such advice does not have to come from malign motives. In practice,
courts routinely fail to ensure that youth understand the magnitude of the
decision they are making when they waive counsel.2 3 1 Even in the small
number of states that have strict requirements regarding juvenile waiver of
counsel, it appears that judges often fail to provide juveniles with even the
most basic of advisories about their rights. 23 2 Even the best juvenile court
stakeholders feel pressure to clear cases from their calendars. Youth may be
further pressured by family members to waive counsel in order to avoid
further delay and processing time in court. These pressures may occur even
Id.
Id. at I 740-41, 747.
226 Id. passim.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1979) ("[A probation officer] is
significantly handicapped by the position he occupies in the juvenile system from serving as an
effective protector of the rights of a juvenile suspected of a crime.").
231 Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
543, 562 (2009); see also Mary Berkheiser, supra note 153, at 601 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
232 Berkheiser, supra note 153, at 617.
224
225
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if parents are not paying for lawyers; many parents mistakenly believe that
proceeding without a lawyer will lead to a better result.
Uncounseled youth are also unlikely to appreciate short- and long-term
consequences of admitting offenses, such as potential incarceration or a
criminal history record. They are unlikely to understand that juvenile courts
can impose dispositions of indeterminate duration and that minor technical
probation violations can lead to long periods of incarceration.233 Youth are
particularly unlikely to be aware of the collateral consequences of an adjudication, including its impact on their education, financial aid, future employment, and access to public housing.2 34 Ironically, at a time when courts are
imposing comprehensive obligations on defense counsel to inform their clients about collateral consequences of convictions, including immigration,3
sex offender registration, 236 and notification consequences, permitting waiver
of counsel leaves the most vulnerable population-youth-without this essential counseling.
a.

The Consequences of Proceeding Without Representation

In the very rare circumstances where a child does seek to represent
herself at a trial, it is an absolute certainty that she will lack the skills and
knowledge necessary to do so as effectively as a trained attorney. Attorneys
in juvenile court require specialized knowledge about the juvenile justice
system. For example, a distinct body of case law has developed around motions to suppress, juvenile competency, mens rea, and culpability, in addition to the standard case law.237 The attorneys must know nomenclature
unheard-of in adult court and they must be familiar with the wide array of
services available to juvenile offenders.238 One commentator has noted that
the representation of juvenile offenders requires specialized skills and
knowledge that even counsel accustomed to dealing with adult defendants
may not possess.23 9 The right to counsel in juvenile proceedings was a relatively recent protection-extended only eight years before Faretta. Just one year before
Farettawas decided, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
" See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 151, at
12 (describing sanctions that may be imposed upon juveniles).

234An adjudication of delinquency may hinder a juvenile's future plans to seek higher
education, obtain employment, or enlist in the military. See generally Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.,
Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings:Part II, 15 CRIM. JUST. 41 (2000) (discussing potential negative consequences of a juvenile adjudication, including barriers to higher
education, eligibility for federal financial aid, and employment).
23.See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
236 See State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956, 965-70 (Wa. 2010).
237Sue Burrell, Juvenile Delinquency: The Casefor Specialty Training, CAL. DAILY J.,
Jan. 14, 2010, available at http://www.ylc.org/articleDetail?id= 165.
238 Id.
239Joanna S. Markman, In re Gault: A Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working? Can It
Work?, 9 BARRY L. REV. 123, 135 (2007) (quoting Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An
Overview of the Attorney-Child ClientRelationship,26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 272-73 (1995)).
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Prevention Act,240 recognizing the problem of the absence of counsel in juvenile court. Congress found that "understaffed, overcrowded juvenile courts,
probation services, and correctional facilities are not able to provide individualized justice or effective help."24 1 Many of these barriers to justice have
persisted and been reported by advocacy groups and researchers:
In its 1993 report, America's Children at Risk: A NationalAgenda

for Legal Action, the Working Group decried the fact that many
thousands of children each year are adjudicated delinquent and incarcerated in facilities resembling jails or prisons, without the benefit of counsel, and that among those who have counsel, many are
represented by lawyers untrained in the complexities of representing children.2 42
In 1995, A Call for Justice found that "34% of the public defender offices
surveyed reported that some percentage of youth in the juvenile courts in
which they work 'waive' their right to counsel at the detention hearing. Reports by appointed counsel are very similar." Additionally, it appears that
while many courts may have been reporting that juveniles elected to
"waive" their right to counsel, the juveniles never meaningfully expressed a
desire to proceed without counsel.2 43 The inescapable conclusion is that
"waiver of counsel" has often been a means to justify denial of counsel. If
waiver of counsel is permitted to continue-with the illusion that it is its
own constitutional right-the due process promise of counsel will continue
to be nothing but an empty promise, its language contorted to erase all
meaning.
The right to counsel is not merely a procedural right; it is the gateway
through which substantive rights are accessed. At each stage of the juvenile
justice process, juveniles must make decisions about whether to move to
suppress certain evidence, whether to proceed to trial or enter an admission,
what type of trial strategy to pursue, whether to move for a finding of incompetency or diversion to the mental health or dependency system, and what
type of disposition best meets the goals and purposes of the state's statute
governing delinquency matters. Good lawyers take the range of future possibilities into account when preparing for each stage in the process. For this
reason, although we permit juveniles to assert or waive certain other rights in
juvenile court-such as the right to a trial or the right against self-incrimination-the assertion or waiver of these other fundamental rights is made only
after the juvenile has the opportunity to consult with counsel to assess the
ramifications of each decision. It is only after she receives the advice of
2

'Pub.

L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974).
note 158, at 20.

241 PuRrz ET AL., supra

Id.
See id. at 7 ("46% of the public defenders say there is a colloquy only 'sometimes' or
'rarely.' In addition, 45% of public defenders say the colloquy is only 'sometimes' or 'rarely'
as thorough as that given to adult defendants and is often a meaningless technicality.").
242
243
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counsel that such decisions are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Juvenile
waiver of right to counsel impairs the fairness of delinquency proceedings
because lawyers are themselves the means of securing a fair trial and maintaining due process throughout the proceedings. 2 " As the right to counsel is
the precursor for ensuring that all rights are exercised throughout the juvenile court process, the line prohibiting waiver is appropriately drawn at
eighteen.
b.

Client Direction

Many lawyers may feel that a ban on waiver would undermine the philosophy of juvenile defense representation-that lawyers are to be "client
directed."2 45 Mandating representation by counsel, however, does not deny
juveniles the opportunity to exercise their autonomy. It is not paternalistic,
nor does it diminish the capabilities of the juvenile. Rather, it is the most
effective way to advocate for the support juveniles need to fully realize their
autonomy. Although experts argue that lawyers for juveniles should be client-directed, 246 those authorities do not undermine a "no waiver" argument.
"Client direction" merely means that after counseling from a lawyer who
has established a lawyer-client relationship, a client has the right to control
the direction of the case, and to direct the lawyer on several key issues. The
client controls whether to plead and whether to take the witness stand; the
client directs whether to ask for a jury;2 47 the client also directs the lawyer
regarding disposition-informing the lawyer of where she wants to live and
what type of facility she would like to be placed in if placement is ordered.2 48
However, all of the "client-directed" decisions are made only after a lawBerkheiser, supra note 153, at 640.
e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: Is It the "Right"
Thing to Do?, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 910 (2007).
2
' See, e.g., NATL JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. AND NATL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
Ass'N, TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING QUALITY DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION
THROUGH INDIGENT DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 1 (2005) ("The Indigent Defense Delivery
System must provide training regarding the stages of child and adolescent development ....
Expectations, at any stage of the court process, of children accused of crimes must be individually defined.").
247 Specifically, the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility provide that:
244

245 See,

(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may
take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether
the client will testify.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2004).
248 See NATL JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra note

246, at 3 ("Indigent defense delivery
system counsel have an obligation to consult with clients and independent from court or probation staff, to actively seek out and advocate for treatment and placement alternatives that best
serve the unique needs and dispositional requests of each child.").
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yer-client relationship has been established. As clients, juveniles maintain
the ability to actively participate in the judicial process and to accept personal responsibility for their decisions concerning whether to accept a plea
and waive the right to a trial and whether to testify at trial. Prohibiting a
waiver of counsel will not detract from those rights.
c.

National Standards on Juvenile Waiver

Four states provide for an unwaivable right to counsel in certain proceedings. Illinois's Juvenile Court Act is the most broad; the juvenile code
specifies that minors charged with a crime "shall have all the procedural
rights of adults in criminal proceedings, unless specifically precluded by
laws that enhance the protection of such minors." 249 Among the rights specifically afforded all minors under the Act, including those charged with a
crime, is the right to be represented by counsel. 25 0 Underscoring the importance of this right, this same section provides that "[n]o hearing .

.

. under

th[e] Act may be commenced unless the minor who is the subject of the
proceeding is represented by counsel.""5 ' In 2005, the Illinois General Assembly further protected this right by amending the Act to provide that, in
delinquency proceedings, "a minor may not waive the right to the assistance
of counsel in his or her defense." 25 2
Three other states provide for an unwaivable right to counsel in most
delinquency hearings. First, Texas law provides that a juvenile's right to
representation by an attorney cannot be waived at any transfer, adjudicatory,
disposition, detention, or mental health comnitment review hearing. 25 3 Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a Rule of Juvenile Court
Procedure that prohibits juvenile waiver of counsel in many cases. 25 4 The
Rule provides that children under the age of fourteen may never waive counsel, 255 and prohibits waiver for all youth during detention, transfer, adjudicatory, disposition, and probation modification hearings. 25 6 If the juvenile does
waive counsel, the waiver only applies to that single proceeding and she may
later revoke that waiver. 257 Furthermore, the Court may appoint standby
counsel if the juvenile waives. While this is not an absolute prohibition on
waiver for juveniles, it goes far in protecting the rights of youth in juvenile
proceedings. Finally, Iowa has a similar statutory provision that prohibits a
child of any age from waiving her right to counsel at a detention, waiver,

249

250

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405 / 5-101(3) (West 2011).
Id. § 405 / 1-5(1).

251
2

52

25

3

254

Id. § 405 / 5-170(b); id. § 405 / 5-115.5.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10(b) (West 2011).

See PA. R. Juv. CT. P. 152(A).
Id.
256 Id.
257
Id. at 152(C).
255
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adjudicatory, disposition, or disposition modification hearing.258 However,
an exception stating that a child under age sixteen may not waive the right to
counsel without written consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian weakens
the statutory right.25 9 If the child is age sixteen or older, the waiver can be
valid if there was a good-faith effort made to notify the parent. 2 60
Moreover, national standards and best practices support requiring an
unwaivable right to counsel for juveniles. Five years after the Supreme
Court in Faretta gave adult defendants a constitutional right to represent
themselves, the Institute for Judicial Administration/American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards ("the Standards") explicitly rejected Faretta's
application to juveniles.2 6 1 The Standards, which prohibit waiver of counsel,
recognize that effective assistance of counsel for juveniles is different. It is
the precursor to a juvenile's ability to exercise all other important rights during the course of the juvenile justice process.2 62 The Standards further distinguished Faretta and Gault: An adult defendant's right of self-representation
grows out of the Sixth Amendment, while the right to counsel in Gault stems
directly from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 263
Furthermore, both the National Juvenile Defender Center and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association call for systems that ban waiver
of counsel by juveniles. Their Ten Core Principlesfor Providing Quality
Delinquency Representation Through Indigent Defense Delivery Systems, a

series of recommendations endorsed by both organizations, include an admonition that states ensure that children do not waive appointment of counsel. 264 And, the Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice recently
emphasized that providing counsel to every child can remedy some of the

2258
59

IOWA

CODE ANN.

§ 232.11(2)

Id. § 232.11(l)-(2).

(West 2011).

Id. While Iowa's right to counsel is protective, it does not provide a fully unwaivable
right to counsel. As discussed earlier in this Article, the Iowa law also fails to consider that a
child's interests may diverge from her parent's interests and a parent may put undue pressure
on a child to waive her right to counsel in an effort to speed the process along.
261 INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR AssN, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDs RELATING To ADJUDICATION (1980) [hereinafter IJA/ABA STANDARDS, ADJUDICAnON], available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/83580.pdf. The IJA/ABA Standards
insist that the "court should not begin adjudication proceedings unless the respondent is represented by an attorney who is present in court," and the commentary explains that this means
"that the right to counsel [is] unwaivable." Id. at 3 (Standard 1.2). Standard 6.1.A. of the
Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings is even more explicit with its insistence that
"a juvenile's right to counsel may not be waived," even though other rights may be waived
under certain circumstances. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR Ass'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS 98 (1980) [hereinafter JA/
ABA STANDARDS, PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS], available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
.pdf (standard 6.1.A).
filesl/ojjdp/83581
262
See IA/ABA STANDARDS, PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 261, at 99
(commentary to Standard 6.1).
263 See IJA/ABA STANDARDS, ADJUDICATION, supra note 261, at 15 (commentary to Standard 1.2).
2" See NAT L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra note 246, at 2 ("The indigent defense delivery system should ensure that children do not waive appointment of counsel.").
260
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most egregious problems in the juvenile justice system, including disproportionate minority contact, inhumane conditions of confinement, inappropriate
transfers to the adult system, and inadequate rehabilitative services.265
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has consistently held that children and youth have a
unique place in society that deserves an equally unique place in the law.
Unlike most other statuses to which the law gives significance, youth is a
transitional phase. We provide juveniles special protection in child welfare
and juvenile justice because they are still developing. They are acquiring
cognitive skills. They are developing psycho-social capacities. They are becoming socialized as they develop adherence to the rule of law. It is in
society's interest to treat them fairly.
While recent case law has continued to recognize the relevance of adolescent development, it has not directly addressed the right to counsel and
the meaningful exercise of that right. Rather, the Court has focused on the
significance of youth to issues such as culpability, punishment, and interrogation. In re Gault was a seminal declaration of the due process rights of
youth, but neither Gault nor its progeny help us understand how characteristics of youth should affect implementation of the right to counsel.
Child welfare and delinquency cases are complex. The facts shift over
time as youth age. Youth behavior is protean-the youth who appeared in
court last year will be a different person today. The varieties of custodial
status-and the duration of youth's stay in placement-will have enormous
consequences for youth's futures. Youth are not only the subject of these
proceedings but also the participants.
It is not surprising, then, that Supreme Court jurisprudence, behavioral
science, and neuroscience reinforce the importance of fundamental fairness
for youth in the child welfare and justice systems. As we have arguedlooking at the stakes and interests of youth, parents, and the state-law and
science point to fundamental fairness requiring a right to counsel for teens in
child welfare matters. The sources support prohibiting the waiver of counsel
for youth in delinquency proceedings. We have argued that these rights are
grounded in the Constitution, and that they importantly recognize the emerging autonomy and personhood of youth, as well as their vulnerability.

265FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 26, available
at http://www.facj.org/annualreports/FACJJ%20Annual%2OReport%2008.pdf (quoting PREsIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMIIES,
AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION (1992)).

